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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The purpose of health insurance is to spread health care risk over a
broad population in order to reduce the financial burden an individual
faces in the case of illness accident. When grouped together for this
purpose, however, seniors represent a high-risk population. Elders are
more like; than others to need health care services yet less likely to have
adequate financial resources.
The Medicare Program began in 1965 as a partial response to the
income and health factors that limit the success of traditional health
insurance for the elderly population. This federal program, however, does
not cover all the health care costs or health care services needed by
seniors. Medicare Supplemental Insurance, or Medigap, developed to fill
the "gaps" in federal coverage.
In Massachusetts, Medigap insurers are regulated by the
Massachusetts Division of Insurance. There are four benefit packages that
govern the structure of all nongroup products available in the state, and
consumer protections guard seniors from some marketing abuses.
Medigap policies cover a range of Medicare deductibles and co-payments
as well as additional benefits, for some packages, such as prescription
drugs. Medicare and Medigap together, however, still do not cover all
necessary health care expenses, most notably long-term care.
As the only insurer in Massachusetts required to offer Medigap
insurance, Blue Cross and Blue Shield (BC/BS) has historically been the
major provider of Medigap coverage in the state. The products offered
through BC/BS under the brand name of Medex are subject to more
regulation than those of either commercial insurers or Health Maintenance
Organizations (HMOs), which offer contracts for Medicare beneficiaries.
BC/BS must provide all seniors with the opportunity to buy Medicare
Supplemental Insurance.
However, rising health care costs combined with the declining
competitiveness of BC/BS are producing Medex premiums so costly that
they block access to health care for growing numbers of low- and middle-
income seniors. The national medical care inflation rate from 1980 to 1990
was 115%, about twice as high as regular inflation. Prescription drug
costs are rising at even faster rates, accounting for about 40% of Medex
premium increases in recent years. Additionally, from 1985 to 1989, the
administrative costs of BC/BS rose significantly faster than claims.
Certain changes in the health insurance industry have reduced the ability
of BC/BS to generate reserves which in the past have offset their losses in
Medex products.
From 1980 to 1990, premium rates for three Medigap plans offered
through BC/BS -- Medex 2, Medex 3, and Standard -- rose 210%, 298%,
and 409% respectively. During that same period, Social Security Cost of
Living Adjustments increased only 52%. Twenty-five years after the
Medicare Program first began to offer elders some relief from their
medical bills, Massachusetts seniors today are spending more of their
income on health care costs.
Growing numbers of seniors are unable to afford Medex premiums
and, regardless of whether they need health care services, are dropping or
downgrading their coverage. While there was a rapid initial growth in
HMO coverage for Medicare beneficiaries, enrollment has slowed in recent
years. And, rather than assuming coverage responsibility for a share of
high-risk seniors, HMOs on average have been insuring younger, healthier
seniors, leaving the "Blues" to cover seniors with more expensive health
care needs. While HMOs were once thought to provide at least a partial
solution to the crisis in Medigap insurance, rising health care costs and
inadequate federal reimbursement levels are beginning to raise doubts.
In 1990 alone, close to 40,000 seniors either dropped or downgraded
their nongroup BC/BS supplemental coverage. The rising rates are
causing some seniors to assume the health and financial risk of being
underinsured. Less healthy seniors with inadequate coverage are choosing
between foregoing necessary medical care or shouldering huge out-of-
pocket costs.
Rising premiums and declining enrollment have given rise to a
number of initiatives on the federal and state levels designed to address
both the immediate need for Medigap relief and also the long-term
questions of Medigap reform. These bills struggle to incorporate premium
reduction and premium subsidization strategies into the current health
care system. Each of the proposed solutions, however, brings with it
political or practical barriers for full and effective implementation.
In this report, we investigate in detail the cost and enrollment
trends in Medigap insurance, particularly in the products of BC/BS, which
give evidence of the crisis situation facing elders today. We critique some
of the proposed solutions currently being debated on the national and state
levels and analyze the impact they may have on the immediate crisis and
long-term problems of Medigap insurance in Massachusetts.
INTRODUCTION
The purpose of health insurance is to spread risk The system
works under the assumption that, at any given point in time, only a
percentage of the people in a given group will be sick. Regardless of
health status, all members of the group will be paying premiums in order
to cover the cost of care for those who need it.
As a group, however, seniors represent a high-risk population. They
are more likely than younger people to need health care services and tend
to require longer hospital stays. Yet, while their expenses are greater,
their financial resources are generally more limited. Seniors are falling
victim to their double vulnerability in the areas of health and income.
As the only insurer in Massachusetts required to offer Medicare
Supplemental Insurance (Medigap), Blue Cross and Blue Shield (BC/BS)
has historically been the major provider of such coverage. Today, however,
rising health care costs combined with the declining competitiveness of
BC/BS are producing expensive Medigap premiums that many people
cannot afford. Growing numbers of Massachusetts' elders are without
adequate health care coverage.
In 1990 alone, close to 40,000 Massachusetts seniors either dropped
or downgraded their nongroup BC/BS supplemental coverage. The rising
premium rates are causing some seniors to assume the health and
financial risk of being underinsured. Other seniors with inadequate
coverage are being forced to choose between foregoing necessary medical
care or shouldering huge out-of-pocket costs.
In this report, we investigate the cost and enrollment trends in
Medigap insurance over the past ten years, particularly those in BC/BS,
and identify some of the systemic problems of Medigap in the context of
the Massachusetts insurance market. Finally, we look at some possible
directions for Medigap insurance reform.
THE BASICS
In order to create a foundation on which to build a better
understanding of the systemic problems in Medicare supplemental
insurance, we begin this report by examining the basics. In this
section, we answer the following four questions:
o What is Medigap insurance?
o What does Medigap insurance coyer?
o Who provides Medigap insurance?
o How is Medigap insurance regulated?
After answering these questions, we look at evidence of a crisis
situation and move forward to suggest directions for reform.
What is Medigap insurance?
Medigap insurance is health insurance, offered by various private
insurers, which supplements the federal Medicare Program.
The Medicare Program is a health insurance program that pays for
a portion of specified medical services for people over 65 as well as certain
disabled individuals. It is a program of the United States Department of
Health and Human Services and is administered by the Health Care
Financing Administration. The Medicare Program began in 1965 under
President Johnson, at a time when elders were spending an average of 15%
of their income on health-related costs.
The Medicare Program is divided in two parts: Part A and Part B.
o Part A generally covers inpatient hospital costs. It is funded
through a portion of the 7.65% Social Security payroll tax on
both employers and employees. For most people there is no
individual premium for Part A.
o Part B covers 80% of physicians' and other outpatient bills.
Twenty-five percent of the funding for Part B comes from
premiums paid by Medicare recipients. In 1991, Part B
premiums were $29.90 per month. The remaining funds for
Part B come from federal general revenue.
This federal program, however, does not cover all the services or all
the costs associated with the health care needs of Medicare recipients.
Routine services including physicals and tests for vision and hearing are
not covered by the Medicare Program. Outpatient prescription drugs are
not covered. Long-term care costs such as nursing home charges and
extended home care are not covered, except under very limited
circumstances.
Additionally, both Medicare Part A and Part B have deductibles, or
minimum out-of-pocket costs, which must be incurred by the enrollee
before the benefits of the program begin. Currently, the first-day hospital
deductible under Part A is $628 and the Part B deductible is $100.
Hospital co-payments (which range from $148 per day after the 60th day
to full payment after the 150th day) and 20% Part B coinsurance are also
the responsibility of the Medicare beneficiary.
In order to address the many expensive "gaps" in Medicare
coverage, supplemental insurance products designed for individuals
enrolled in both parts of the Medicare Program have been developed.
Collectively, the various Medicare supplemental products are referred to
as "Medigap" insurance.
What does Medigap insurance cover?
Medigap insurance generally covers some combination of Medicare
deductibles, hospital co-payments, and Part B coinsurance. Certain
policies may also include coverage for prescription drugs, home health
care, preventive care, and excess doctors' charges.
Excess doctors' charges occur when physicians bill Medicare for
more than the amount approved by Medicare for given procedures.
Medicare pays only 80% of its approved amount, leaving the beneficiary
with the 20% Part B coinsurance plus all of the cost above the approved
amount. In Massachusetts, physicians are prohibited from charging and
collecting more than the Medicare approved amount. This prohibition is
referred to as the "ban on balance billing." In other words, the patient is
not liable for the balance of the bill, or the amount beyond the approved
charge.
Because there are hundreds of different Medigap policies offered
across the country, there is no simple answer to the question of what
Medigap covers. To address this confusion, Congress in 1990 ordered the
standardization of Medigap policies. In response, the National
Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) tentatively approved 10
standardized benefit packages. According to the NAIC, all of these
policies include a set of "basic benefits'' which consist of payment of the
20^ Part B coinsurance and the hospital co-payments for the 61st to 90th
days.
Unlike most state regulators, however, the Massachusetts Division
of Insurance already controls the benefit content of the nongroup Medigap
policies sold in the state. Only four nongroup (see p. 5) benefit packages
can be sold in Massachusetts. The basic benefits of each of these plans
are shown in the table below:
Massachusetts Medigap Packages
BENEFIT
PLAN 1
* Standard
PLAN 2
* Medex 2
PLAN 3
• Medex 3
PLAN 4
* Basic
Hospital Deductible No Yes Yes No
Hospital Co-payments Yes Yes Yes Yes
Part B Deductible No Yes Yes No
Part B Coinsurance Yes Yes Yes Yes
Excess Doctors' Charges NONE
IN MASS
NONE
IN MASS
NONE
IN MASS
NONE
IN MASS
Home Health Care No No No No
Prescription Drugs 100% generic,
80% brand;
$35 /quarter
deductible
No 100% generic,
80% brand;
$35 /quarter
deductible
100% generic,
80% brand;
$250/year
deductible
Mail -Order Prescription
Drugs
$2.00 generic;
$10.00 brand
No $2.00 generic;
$10.00 brand
$2.00 generic;
$10.00 brand
Preventive Care No No No No
• Corresponding Blue Cross/Blue Shield Plans
Source: Massachusetts Division of Insurance
It is important to remember that no Medigap policy covers all of
the gaps in the Medicare Program (for example, almost none cover long-
term care expenses) and that Medigap will not pay anything for medical
services denied by Medicare.
^oAAirv, ^aAActcAaAe//^ 02425-3393
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Dear Colleague,
The enclosed report, Medicare Supplemental Insurance:
Today's Crisis, provides important data that explains the crisis
situation in which elders are struggling to pay tor necessary
health insurance. For those attempting to provide solutions to
this problem, it also discusses reforms.
From 1980 to 1990, the cost of Medex 3, the most popular
supplemental policy in Massachusetts, has increased almost 300
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reducing or dropping their supplemental coverage.
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lawmakers, advocates, and policymakers to seek appropriate
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Who provides Medigap insurance?
There are two basic types of private Medigap coverage: traditional
fee-for-service plans and Health Maintenance Organization (HMO) plans.
Fee-for-service plans, also known as indemnity plans, include the
majority of plans offered by BC/BS and commercial insurers. Under these
plans, insurers pay hospitals and physicians each time an enrollee receives
medical care. In contrast, an HMO is a provider/insurer system which
agrees to manage the care of an enrollee. For a fixed premium, an HMO
provides medical services through a specified set of doctors and hospitals
that cover a defined geographic area. The network of providers is known
as the delivery system.
Elders may be insured either under group plans or nongroup plans.
Group plans are available to seniors through a past or current employer
or union or through a member-based organization, such as the American
Association for Retired Persons (AARP). Nongroup or individual plans
are directly established between seniors and insurers.
In 1990, BC/BS and the Massachusetts Division of Insurance
• ndertook a joint project to look at the decline in BC/BS's ability to
compete in the insurance market. The resulting Cresap-Tillinghast report
indicated that 75% of the Medicare-eligible population in the state in 1988
had Medigap coverage.
Medigap Coverage in Massachusetts
o joy© were covered Dy
BC/BS non-group coverage; Uninsured/ _-*!
Medicaid^-::::::::
BC/f
- ::| ~~ --^Nongr
3S
3Up
o 18% were covered by
commercial insurers;
o 13% were covered by
BC/BS group plans; and
HMOs VjHMM^fflElMJ^^^^J J
o 8% were covered by HMOs.
Commercial
Insurers
^^m^ma^^-— bc/bs Group
Source: Cresap-Tillinghast Analysis, 1990
Most of the remaining 25% either had no Medigap coverage or received
their Medigap coverage through Medicaid, the federal/state health care
program for the poor.
Blue Cross and Blue Shield The most popular Medigap policies
are offered through BC/BS under the brand name of Medex. Both
nongroup and group plans are available. These Medigap policies offer
relatively comprehensive benefits, and all Medicare-eligible residents of the
Commonwealth who are enrolled in Medicare Part A and Part B are
guaranteed the opportunity to buy coverage. Because BC/BS insures many
people who have expensive needs, the growing cost of this coverage is
forcing many people to drop or downgrade their Medex policy.
Qmmgpjal Insurers. Banker's Life and Mutual of Omaha are
examples of commercial insurers that provide nongroup policies. AARP is
an example of a member organization that offers group health insurance
policies. Because commercial insurers are able to age-rate, a practice of
charging higher premiums to older enrollees, and to reject coverage on the
basis of health status, they serve a smaller, and probably healthier,
segment of Medicare beneficiaries than does BC/BS. According to a
General Accounting Office (GAO) report (see Congressional Quarterly.
February 17, 1990), on average premium rates for commercial insurers are
rising more slowly than those for BC/BS.
Health Main^nanrp Organizations. There are three types of HMO
coverage for Medicare beneficiaries: Risk Contracts, Wrap-Around
Contracts, and Cost Contracts. All HMO plans have some restrictions on
which health care providers a beneficiary may choose.
An HMO Medicare Risk Contract is a substitute for rather than a
supplement to Medicare. Under a Risk Contract, an HMO agrees to a
certain level of federal reimbursement for providing elders with health care
services. (The reimbursement level is computed using a formula that
begins with 95% of the estimated Part A and Part B costs for a senior on a
fee-for-service plan and adjusts this figure based on demographic factors.)
A beneficiary receives all the benefits of Medicare Parts A and B without
deductibles and co-payments. There are usually additional preventive care
benefits. All medical services must be received within the HMO delivery
system in order to be reimbursed. Neither Medicare benefits nor
supplemental benefits extend beyond the delivery system. In 1991, 6 out of
23 licensed HMOs in Massachusetts had Medicare Risk Contracts.
HMOs may also choose to offer Wrap-Around Contracts or Cost
Contracts, plans that function more like traditional Medigap products.
While these types of contracts look almost identical to a Risk Contract for
the Medicare beneficiary receiving care from within the delivery system,
they are supplements to, not substitutes for, Medicare. HMOs, which may
have switched to these models because they found the Medicare
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reimbursement inadequate, are federally reimbursed on a fee-for-service
basis. Central Massachusetts Health Care and Tufts Associated Health
Plan are two examples of HMOs that have dropped their Risk Contracts
and replaced them with Wrap-Around Contracts.
Under Wrap-Around Contracts, enrollees receive all supplemental
Medicare benefits when utilizing services within the delivery system. This
means that enrollees do not pay Medicare deductibles or co-payments. In
contrast to the Risk Contracts, however, the Wrap-Around Contracts allow
enrollees to maintain Medicare Part A and Part B benefits outside the
delivery system provided they pay all deductibles and co-payments.
Cost Contracts are a combination of the Risk Contracts and Wrap-
Around Contracts. Under Cost Contracts, there are again full
supplemental benefits within the HMO delivery system. Outside the
system, however, enrollees maintain only Medicare Part A benefits and
must themselves pay the hospital deductible and coinsurance. Medicare
Part B services are only reimbursable within the delivery system.
How is Medigap insurance regulated?
Until 1978, Medigap policies were regulated as other insurance
products were -- by state government. As the Medigap insurance industry
grew, however, abuses in the market quickly developed. By the mid-1970s,
abuses such as the following began to surface:
o the sale of multiple, overlapping Medigap policies to the
same individual;
o the sale of policies that duplicated the Medicare or Medicaid
coverage the individual was already receiving; and
o the sale of worthless policies through clever marketing
devices, including scare tactics and the use of misleading
names, single "dread disease" plans.
These practices were serious enough to command federal attention.
FEDERAL REGULATIONS
Baucos Amendment The most notable early effort to reduce abuses
related to the sale of Medigap policies was the 1980 Baucus Amendment,
named for its chief sponsor Senator Max Baucus. Included in the
Amendment was the prohibition of the sale of duplicate policies to the
same individual and the setting of "federal standards." These standards
defined basic coverage and required that 60% of the monies collected as
premiums for nongroup policies and 75% for group policies be returned to
the enrollees in the form of benefits. These percentages are known as loss
ratios.
The Amendment was, however, a voluntary program. Insurers who
agreed to the guidelines were declared "federally approved," but other
insurers were not prohibited from offering policies. The Baucus
Amendment proved to be but one in a series of federal reforms aimed at
eliminating the abuses in the Medigap market.
QjjUjjjgiia Budget Reconciliation Act The most recent federal
initiative regulating the sale of Medigap policies is contained in the
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990 (OBRA '90). Included in
OBRA '90 are provisions that:
o require that every policy offer a core group of "basic benefits"
which address certain costs of Medicare Part A and Part B;
o standardize the language of policies in order to make
comparisons among the many policies easier;
o require that each policy inform the Medicare recipient that
only one Medigap policy is needed or, if on Medicaid, no
Medigap policy is needed;
o increase the protection against the sale of duplicate coverage
to the same individual;
o mandate enrollment eligibility for all seniors for the first six
months after they turn 65;
o guarantee renewability;
o mandate the approval of each Medigap policy by the state
insurance commission or comparable body; and
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o require that 65% (rather than the previous 60%) of the
premium collected for nongroup policies be returned to the
enrollees in benefits (effective November 1991).
These federal regulations apply to all nongroup Medigap policies in all
states.
STATE REGULATIONS
In comparison with other states, Massachusetts has many more
regulations relating to Medigap policies. As noted above, there are only
four approved nongroup benefit packages. This means that all nongroup
Medigap policies offered in the Commonwealth must fit the coverage
requirements of one of the four packages. Premium rates for all these
policies are subject to disapproval by the Massachusetts Division of
Insurance. Additionally, no Medigap policy approved for sale may exclude
coverage for any particular health condition. The practice of refusing
coverage for health services related to a particular illness or health
problem is known as a pre-existing condition exclusion.
Blue Cross and Bine Shield Rpgnlatipna. BC/BS was chartered
under Massachusetts law as a "nonprofit hospital service corporation" and
a "medical service corporation." (See Chapters 176A and 176B of the
Massachusetts General Laws.) BC/BS has the unique social responsibility
of providing access to health care for all residents of the Commonwealth,
regardless of health status.
As products of the "insurer of last resort," the Medigap packages of
BC/BS, sold under the brand name of Medex, are subject to more
regulation than any other policies. BC/BS must:
o accept all applicants;
o hold an open enrollment period from February 1 - March 31;
o NOT age-rate, a practice of charging higher premiums for
older seniors;
o set premium rates by pooling everyone in the state, a process
known as community rating;
o keep premium rates in effect for an entire year,
subject nongroup premiums to approval by the
Massachusetts Division of Insurance;
subject nongroup premiums to a public hearing; and
demonstrate cost containment measures each year which
result in savings for Medex customers. An example is the
recently approved mail-order drug option. The requirement
that BC/BS demonstrate annual cost containment measures
is known as Chapter 199 and has been in effect since 1984.
(See p. 28.)
r^mmprcial Insurer Regulations, Commercial insurers are subject
only to the above mentioned federal and state regulations which apply to
all Medigap policies. They are free to reject applicants because of health
status and can charge higher premiums to older enrollees. Unlike BC/BS,
they can raise their premiums at any point throughout the year.
Health Mainten^nrp Organization Regulations. There are specific
consumer protections for enrollees in HMOs. All HMOs offering the
federal Medicare substitute plans known as Risk Contracts must have
internal Quality Assurance Programs. Peer Review Organizations evaluate
the access and quality of care provided by HMOs.
While HMOs are not required to offer supplemental coverage to
Medicare beneficiaries, if they choose to do so, they must have a two-
month open enrollment period for individuals and must coordinate their
group enrollment with other group health plans. There are no state
regulations governing age-rating and pre-existing condition exclusions for
these HMO plans, but "federally approved" HMOs cannot base their
premiums on age and are limited in the exclusions they can make based
on health status. Unlike BC/BS, HMOs can raise their premiums at any
point throughout the year for their supplemental-type contracts.
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COST TRENDS
In this chapter we will investigate the increases in the premium
rates for the four Medigap products offered by BC/BS: Standard,
Medex 2, Medex 3, and Basic. We will examine the impact of the
changing health insurance industry and the decreasing
competitiveness of BC/BS on the 300% increase in Medex 3
premiums over the past ten years.
In 1991, almost 73% of seniors enrolled in BC/BS Medex plans
were enrolled in Medex 3, the most comprehensive Medex product. Listed
below, side-by-side, are the monthly premiums for Medex 3, and the Social
Security Cost-of-Living Adjustments (SSCOLAs) for the same time period.
SSCOLAs are used to determine elders' monthly Social Security checks.
The total percentage increase of seniors' Social Security income was 52%
while the corresponding aggregate rise in premiums was 298%.
Social Security v. Medex 3
Year
SSCOLA
% Increase
Medex 3
% Increase
Medex 3
Monthly Premiums
1980 14.3% 15.8% $21.58
1981 11.2% 7.6% $23.21
1982 7.4% 20.6% $27.99
1983 delayed til 1/84 22.9% $34.39
1984 3.5% 16.4% $40.04
1985 3.5% 8.2% $43.34
l<>86 3.1% 0.0% $43.34
1987 1.3% 10.5% $47.89
1988 4.2% 9.3% $52.32
1989 4.0% 0.0% $52.32
1990 4.7% 64.1% $85.87
TOTAL 52 % 298%
1991 5.4% 7.0% $91.97
These are non group premium rates. Group rates are not subject to the approval of the Division of
Insurance and may therefore be significantly higher.
Source: Massachusetts Division of Insurance
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In 1980, seniors on Medex 3 were paying $258.96 per year for their
Medicare supplemental insurance. In 1990, they were paying $1030.44 per
year. If the premium rates had risen at the same rate as the SSCOLAs,
which determine seniors' Social Security income, seniors enrolled in Medex
3 would only be paying $392.58 per year.
Although increases in Medex 2 and Standard policies affect fewer
seniors, they have also been substantial. According to figures at the
Massachusetts Division of Insurance, the ten-year period which brought
seniors a 52% increase in their Social Security checks also brought them a
210% increase in Medex 2 and a 409% increase in Standard. Basic, a new
product first sold by BC/BS in 1990 rose 3.6% in 1991.
Monthly Premium Rates
1980 to 1990
Year Standard %Incr. Medex 2 %Incr. Basic %Incr.
1980 $14.02 $18.40
1981 $15.36 9.6% $19.86 7.9%
1982 $18.14 18.1% $24.59 23.8%
1983 $22.92 26.4% $28.87 17.4%
1984 $26.89 17.3% $32.26 11.7%
1985 $29.07 8.1% $32.73 1.5%
1986 $29.07 0.0% $32.73 0.0%
1987 $32.12 10.5% $36.17 10.5%
1988 $38.83 20.9% $31.73 -12.3%
1989 $38.83 0.0% $31.73 0.0%
1990 $71.29 83.6% $57.12 80.0% $64.69
TOTAL 409 % 210 %
1991 $75.05 5.3% $57.58 .8% $67.00 3.6%
Source: Massachusetts Division of Insurance
The following bar graph compares the rate increases of the three Medex
products - Standard, Medex 2, and Medex 3 - and the SSCOLA over the
period 1980 to 1990.
12
Medex Premium and SSCOLA Increases
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FEDERAL FACTORS
Health Care Costs. Rising medical costs are playing a role in the
increasing unaffbrdablity of Medigap insurance. The Massachusetts
medical care inflation rates have been running at 9% since 1985, with a
total increase of 147% from 1980 to 1990. Below are the national inflation
rates alongside the Medex 3 premium increases.
Health Care Costs
Year
National
Inflation
National
Medical
National
Hospital Medex 3
19S1 10.4% 10.8% 14.2% 7.6%
1982 6.1% 11.6% 14.2% 20.6%
1983 3.2% 8.7% 11.4% 22.9%
1984 4.3% 6.2% 8.6% 16.4%
1985 3.6% 6.2% 6.4% 8.2%
1986 1.9% 7.5% 6.0% 0.0%
1987 4.4% 5.8% 6.9% 10.5%
1988 4.1% 6.5% 7.4% 9.3%
1989 4.8% 7.7% 7.1% 0.0%
1990 5.4% 9.0% 10.9% 64.1%
TOTAL 60 % 115 % 142 % 298 %
Source: Dureai oi Labor Statistics
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Health Care Costs, 1980-1990
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While hospital and medical inflation rates are high, drug costs are
higher still. According to the Division of Insurance (see Nancy Turnbull,
Trends in Medex Use in Massachusetts" in Elders at Risk. 1989), while
the total amount paid out in claims by BC/BS for Medex 3 members
increased 143% from 1980 to 1986, the largest item increase in claims was
for prescription drugs. Prescription drug claims quintupled. From 1980-
1987, the average annual number of prescriptions per enrollee rose from
62 to 13. Accompanying this increased utilization was a jump in the
average cost of a prescription from $9.49 to $17.50.
Changs, in the Medicare Program. Changes in the Medicare
Program have also affected Medigap insurance in Massachusetts. In 1988
the Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act (MCCA) was signed into law.
The MCCA brought changes that expanded some areas of Medicare
coverage and transferred certain costs, including the hospital deductible,
away from Medigap policies.
When this act was repealed in 1989, approximately $100 million in
Medicare costs were shifted back to BC/BS Medigap plans. In addition to
the costs of the benefits taken back by Medigap, there were also
administrative costs associated with policy modification and notification.
A GAO survey (see Congressional Quarterly. February 17, 1990) estimated
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that half of the average Medigap premium increases in the nation in 1990
were directly related to the repeal of the MCCA. Changes on the national
level only account for a portion of the crisis in Massachusetts, however.
While the same GAO survey reported that the anticipated rate increases
were to range from 5% to 52%, the Medex rate increase in this state was
67%.
BLUE CROSS AND BLUE SHIELD
gaafflg for Varying Percentage Increases in Medea. Over the
period from 1980 to 1990, Medex 2 premiums increased 210% as compared
with 298% for Medex 3 and 409% for Standard. The year-by-year
reporting of the premium rates (see p. 12) reveals that in 1988 the
premium rate for Medex 2 actually decreased. The major reason for the
substantial difference in increases among the various plans lies in the fact
that, unlike the Medex 3 and Standard policies, Medex 2 does not offer
any coverage for prescription drugs. The dramatic increases in cost as
well as utilization of prescription drugs have been passed on in the form of
higher premiums for Medex 3 and Standard enrollees.
As the premiums have increased, people who do not use
prescription drugs (as well as seniors who simply cannot afford the
premiums) have downgraded their Standard or Medex 3 coverage to
Medex 2. This trend leaves only high users of drugs in the plans covering
drugs, thereby increasing the number of claims filed in relation to the
number of enrollees. Increased utilization then causes increases in
premium rates.
Increases in Standard over the same period exceeded those of
Medex 3, a more comprehensive plan. While both products cover
prescription drugs and have the same $35 quarterly deductible, Standard
does not cover the hospital deductible or the Part B deductible. The
difference in the premium increases of these two plans is largely a result of
the percentage of the total premium rate dedicated to prescription drugs.
Prescription drug costs for Standard represent a larger portion of the total
premium than for Medex 3. According to the 1991 rate filing breakdown
of the Massachusetts Division of Insurance, prescription drugs accounted
for $34.65 of the monthly premiums for both Standard and Medex 3. This
represents 46% of the Standard premium as opposed to only 38% of the
Medex 3 premium.
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Premium Breakdowns for BC/BS Medigap Plans
1S91
Standard
Hospital Co-
pays 4%
Medex 2
Prescription
Drugs 46%
Part 8
Coinsurance
20%
Other 29% Part B
Coinsurance
26%
Hospital
Deductible
25%
Hospital
Co-pays 5*/.
Part B
Deductible 6%
Medex 3
Prescription
Drugs 38%
Hospital
Deductible
15%
Hospital Co-
pays 3%
Part B
Deductible 4%
Part B
Coinsurance
16%
Prescription
Drugs 40%
Hospital Co-
pays 5%
Basl
Part B
Colnsurancii
23%
Other 24%
Other 33%
Source: Massachusetts Division of Insurance
Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding.
BeasaaiBj Comjg&jyengaa of BC/BS. In the past, the size of
BC/BS - covering 54% of the insured population in Massachusetts in 1988
(64% including BC/BS HMOs) - and the benefits it enjoyed in exchange
for its status as the "insurer of last resort" allowed BC/BS to sustain
losses in its Medigap products without risking the stability of the
company. Statutory hospital discounts as weU as other "advantages"
including partial tax-exempt status, the ban on balance billing, and the
restrictions on reimbursement to nonparticipating physicians, allowed
BC/BS to generate reserves from which it could then subsidize its
expensive lines of coverage internally.
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However, changes in the health insurance industry and increased
costs and utilization of medical care have undermined the competitive
position of BC/BS and have made internal generation of reserves and the
following subsidization of Medigap policies increasingly difficult.
The key change in the insurance market in recent years has been
the increasing ability of HMOs and commercial insurers to negotiate
discounts on hospital charges with providers. Often these negotiated
discounts are greater than the statutory discounts for BC/BS which were
designed to allow BC/BS to compete with other insurers.
As HMOs and commercial insurers take away the more profitable
lines of BC/BS through competitive premiums and benefits, BC/BS loses
its source of internal subsidization for the regulated, high-risk lines,
including Medex, which by law it must insure. Over a four-year period
ending in 1990, BC/BS reported a loss of 800,000 subscribers.
Administrative Costs. At the same time that BC/BS was losing the
competitive advantage of its hospital discounts and, as a result, business
among younger groups, the administrative costs of BC/BS were increasing
significantly faster than income from its premiums. According to five-year
historical data on BC/BS which was part of its 1990 filing, from 1985 to
1989, both the income earned from premiums and the claims incurred
increased 34%. The administrative expenses over the same period of time
increased by 52%. Administrative costs include marketing and claims
processing.
17
ENROLLMENT TRENDS
Along with the substantial premium increases over the past ten
years, BC/BS has experienced both an overall decline in enrollment
in its Medigap policies and also a shift in the distribution over its
four plans. In this chapter we look at the movement within the
Medigap market along with its effect on seniors. We also explore
the suggested partial solution to the Medigap crisis: HMO
managed care.
The table below shows the 1980 to 1990 approximate enrollment
figures for both Medex nongroup and group policies and for HMO
policies. The percentage figures indicate approximately what portion of
Massachusetts residents over the age of 65 were covered by each Medigap
option. Elders covered by Medicaid or by commercial insurers are not
included in the table.
Medigap Enrollment
1980 to 1990
Year
*
#Mass
Elders
**
#in
HMOs
%in
HMOs
***
#Group
Medex
%Group
Medex
***
#Non-
Group
%Non-
Group
1980 726,531 4,000 .6% 127,000 17.5% 313,000 43.1%
1984 773,000 20,000 2.6% 119,000 15.4% 325,000 42.0%
1986 791,000 53,162 6.7% 125,000 15.8% 292,000 36.9%
1987 800,000 55,728 7.0% 124,000 15.5% 294,000 36.8%
1988 806,000 54,068 6.7% 102,000 12.7% 288,000 35.7%
1989 815,000 65,200 8.0% 102,670 12.6% 293,801 36.0%
1990 819,284 60^22 7.3% 99,828 12.2% 275,392 33.6%
1980, 1990 United States Census
1984-1988 United States Department of Commerce, Population Estimates and Projections
Massachusetts Association of HMOs
BC/BS of Massachusetts
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BLUE CROSS AND BLUE SHIELD
Enrollment Shifting. Enrollment figures alone, however, do not tell
the whole story. While HMOs are insuring a slowly growing segment of
the Medicare- eligible population, their participation in the Medigap
market does not necessarily reduce the strain on BC/BS which must
insure the high-risk elderly population. Because HMOs are able to insure
selected segments of the population, their participation in the Medigap
market is working against BC/BS. A 1990 General Accounting Office
report (GAO 1990 T-HRD-90-27) published the findings of national studies
which indicated that seniors enrolled in HMOs tend to be healthier and
their care less expensive than average.
The Cresap-Tillinghast analysis reported that from 1982 to 1988,
BC/BS lost 11.4% of the Medicare eligible population aged 65 to 69. This
represents a loss of the youngest, and probably healthiest, segment of the
population. In contrast, over the same time period, BC/BS gained 5.8% of
the market for seniors over age 85.
Shift in BC/BS Share of
Medicare-Eligible Population
1982-1988
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Source: Cresap-Tillinghast Analysis, 1990
Nationally, the number of "oldest old is growing six times faster than any
other segment of the population.
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Additionally, the shift of seniors away from BC/BS is much slower
than the shift of the younger populations which make up the more
profitable insurance lines of BC/BS. As changes in the insurance industry
decrease the competitiveness of BC/BS and allow HMOs to draw more of
the market through relatively attractive premiums and benefits, seniors
represent a growing percentage of the total business of BC/BS. The
Cresap report showed that in 1988 BC/BS had 42% of the
Commonwealth's insured group market in contrast to approximately 65%
of the insured Medicare-eligible population.
Movement within Bf/BS. The 1990 increases in Medex premium
rates caused an alarming number of seniors to drop or downgrade their
BC/BS coverage to less comprehensive and lower-cost plans.
Voluntary terminations in nongroup Medex plans rose from 1,635 in
1989 to 4,687 in 1990. This represents a 186.7% increase in the number of
individuals dropping their Medex coverage. Nonpayment terminations,
terminations which were not requested but occurred because of
nonpayment of premiums, more than doubled, rising from 3,424 in 1989 to
8,220 in 1991.
Many other seniors are assuming more risk, downgrading their
coverage while they are relatively healthy or simply because they have been
priced out of the market. Out of 27,350 elders who individually changed
their coverage in 1990, only 1,000 upgraded it.
Shifts in Medex Enrollment
1990
20,000 DOWNGRADED - from Medex 3 to Medex 2
2,600 DOWNGRADED - from Medex 3 to Basic
2,400 DOWNGRADED - from Medex 3 to Standard
1,000 DOWNGRADED - from Standard to Medex 2
300 DOWNGRADED • from Standard to Basic
1,050 UPGRADED - from Medex 2 to Basic
Source: Blue Cross and Blue Shield
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Dangers of Assuming Greater Risk. Downgrading and dropping
coverage creates problems both for individual seniors and for the Medigap
insurance system as a whole. Some seniors assume greater risk in order to
pay less in premiums while they remain relatively healthy, thereby
endangering their health and their financial security. Others simply
cannot afford the health coverage they truly need.
If individuals among the 21,000 who downgraded their coverage
from Medex 3 or Standard to Medex 2 suddenly need drugs, they will
either face the financial burden of paying for prescription drugs
themselves or they will face more serious illness by going without. If
seniors among the 5,000 who downgraded from Medex 3 to Standard or to
Basic end up in the hospital, they will immediately find themselves with a
$628 first-day hospital deductible.
Additionally, downgrading to a lower-coverage policy and dropping
coverage entirely may have negative effects on the premiums of those
individuals who remain in more comprehensive plans. Health insurance is
designed to spread the cost of health care over as broad of a population as
possible by including healthy people who will not use some benefits.
As more healthy seniors downgrade out of the most comprehensive
Medex 3, the concept of health insurance as risk sharing is destroyed. The
pool of individuals paying for comprehensive benefits becomes both
smaller and less healthy. In 1988, 84% of seniors insured by BC/BS were
covered by Medex 3. In 1990, approximately 73% were enrolled in that
plan (Massachusetts Division of Insurance). Increased claims because of
a sicker risk pool combined with fewer people contributing premiums force
some premium components of comprehensive coverage to cost more.
There is evidence that may suggest that this process, known as
adverse selection, is happening. The distribution of the Medex composite
rate increase across the four plans was significantly different in 1991 than
in 1990. In 1991 the proposed increase in Medex 3 of 11.1% was greater
than the average of the four plans while in 1990 it was lower than the
average 1° 1990 *h* cost of Medex 3 increased by 64% while Medex 2 and
Standard increased by 80% and 84% respectively.
Downgrading and dropping coverage has negative effects on seniors,
on BC/BS, and also on the larger health care system. When access to
health care becomes more difficult, both practically and financially in
terms of increased out-of-pocket costs, it becomes more likely that when an
individual finally receives care it will be expensive. Preventive medicine is
less expensive than emergency room costs.
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Poverty Issues
.
There is no conclusive data available on the income
ranges of Medigap enrollees. However, while it is clear that some seniors
are dropping or downgrading Medigap coverage because they can no
longer afford the premiums, seniors who struggle to maintain coverage are
not necessarily able to manage their payments without substantial
financial sacrifice.
According to a Lewis/ICF analysis of population data from 1985-
1988, 16% of Massachusetts senior households live at or below the poverty
line. Another 21% live between poverty and 150% of poverty. Thirty-three
percent live between 150% and 300% of poverty.
Poverty Levels of Massachusetts Elders
400%+ of
Poverty 18%
300-399% of
Poverty 11%
200-299% of
Poverty 20%
Source: Lewis/ICF Analysis
Below Poverty
16%
100-149% of
Poverty 21%
50-199% of
Poverty 13%
These percentages are based on single senior households which include all
non-institutionalized individuals 65 or older and households of couples in
which one or both individuals are 65 or older. Because couples tend to be
better off financially than individual seniors and yet only count once in the
computation of the percentage, the figures above indicate a larger
proportion of elderly at the poverty level than is actually true. However,
on the other hand, since poverty guidelines are lower for couples than for
two individual seniors, couples may be classified misleadingly in higher
income level categories. Couples pay the same in health care premiums as
two individual seniors.
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1991 Federal Poverty Guidelines
Individual Couple
100% $ 6,620 $ 8,880
150% $ 9,930 $13320
200% $13,240 $17,760
300% $19,860 $26,640
400% $26,480 $35,520
A 1988 analysis ( 1988 Living Budgets for Low-Income Seniors in
Massachusetts. Health Care For All) revealed that after paying monthly
expenses excluding medical care, seniors up to 200% of poverty had no or
insufficient income to pay their Medicare Part B and Medex 3 premiums.
In 1991, seniors paid $358.80 annually for Medicare Part B
coverage. If enrolled in Medex 3, they spent $1,103.64 per year on
premiums alone. These two costs together represent 15% of the income for
a senior living at 150% of the poverty level and 11% for a senior living at
200% of the poverty level. The situation is even more serious for couples.
Couples living at 150% of poverty spend about 22% of their income on
Medicare and comprehensive Medigap premiums and couples at 200% of
poverty spend an average of 17%. These percentages do not include the
$35 Medex 3 quarterly drug deductible or coverage for extended hospital
or nursing home care, extended home health care, routine physicals, vision,
foot care, and dental care.
The passing of the 1988 Medicare Catastrophic Act (parts of which
were repealed in 1989, see p. 14) brought a buy-in benefit for all low-
income Medicare beneficiaries. This program, known as the Qualified
Medicare Beneficiary Program (QMB) authorizes the Department of
Public Welfare (DPW) to pay the Medicare premiums, co-payments, and
deductibles of beneficiaries who meet income and asset guidelines. In
1991, a senior could have assets no greater than $4,000 for an individual
and $6,000 for a couple and could have income no greater than 100% of
the poverty level.
Under the QMB Program, the $29.90 monthly premium for
Medicare Part B is noi automatically deducted from a senior's monthly
Social Security check. DPW automatically covers the premium, and
seniors do not need Medigap insurance to cover their Medicare
deductibles and co-payments.
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Since the passage of the QMB Program, there has been an effort to
enroll qualified elderly into this program and bring some relief to low-
income elders. Efforts, however, have not been successful. According to a
Families USA Foundation report (see The Secret Benefit: The Failure to
Provide Medicare Buv-in to Poor Seniors . 1991), out of the 77,000 seniors
(plus a lesser number of disabled under age 65) eligible for the QMB
program in Massachusetts, 45,000 (58%) are not enrolled. Most of these
people do not receive Medicaid, and many are almost certainly purchasing
Medigap coverage.
According to a report released by the Harvard School of Public
Health, Louis Harris and Associates, and the Department of Medical
Security (see A Household Survey of the Health Insurance Status of
Massachusetts Residents. 1990), an underinsured individual is one whose
out-of-pocket health care costs exceed 10% of personal income.
If we use this standard conservatively and agree that 10% of annual
income is a reasonable amount to dedicate to health care premium costs
(as opposed to all health care costs), seniors at the poverty level need an
annual subsidy of over $2,000 while those at 300% of poverty need
approximately $250. An adequate subsidy based on assistance to all
seniors at or below 300% of the poverty rate (and assuming increased
enrollment in Medicaid and the QMB Program) would run in the
neighborhood of $151 million for the state of Massachusetts.
MANAGED CARE AND THE ROLE OF HMOs
With health care costs rising and Medicare coverage being cut back
with the repeal of the MCCA, the federal government has encouraged the
coverage of Medicare beneficiaries through managed care options rather
than through fee-for-service plans, such as those traditionally offered by
BC/BS. As both insurers and providers, HMOs seemed to meet the
perceived need of cost-effective care and to offer a reasonable solution to
the growing unaffordability of BC/BS Medigap products.
In 1985, when HMOs first opened their doors to seniors on a large
scale, there was an initial wave of enrollments of Medicare beneficiaries in
these managed care programs. In recent years, however, growth has
slowed significantly. (See p. 18.) While managed care plans offer positive
incentives for providing efficient care, rising health care costs are driving
up HMO premiums as well.
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HMO Monthly Premiums
Year
Harvard
Community % Incr Bay State % Incr Fallon % Incr
1987 $45.00 $31.75 $20.00
1988 $55.00 22.2% $60.20 89.6% $35.00 75.0%
1989 $67.50 22.7% $55.00 -9.5% $53.50 52.9%
1990 $70.00 3.7% $55.00 0.0% $59.72 11.6%
TOTAL 55 % 73 % 199 %
Source: 1987-1988 Office of Prepaid Health Care
1989-1990 Executive Office of Elder Affairs
The increases in the premiums for these HMOs have a fairly wide
range. Although some have been more moderate than those for Medex, all
have been greater than both the SSCOLAs and the medical inflation rate
over the same time period. Unlike BC/BS, if providing health care to the
Medicare population becomes too costly and federal reimbursement for
Risk Contracts inadequate, HMOs can choose not to offer Medigap
products at all or to offer only the more traditional Wrap-Around
Contracts. (See p. 6.)
According to the Massachusetts Association of HMOs, in 1988, 15
out of the 22 licensed HMOs in Massachusetts (68%) offered Risk
Contracts. In 1991, only 6 out of the 23 licensed HMOs (26%) offered
Risk Contracts. Three offered Wrap-Around Contracts and three offered
Cost Contracts. These newer products are supplements to rather than
substitutes for Medicare and provide less opportunity for cost
containment.
In addition to their demonstrated limitations in the area of cost
containment, HMOs have specific restrictions which make them
inappropriate for some elderly people. As explained above, all HMO plans
have both provider and geographic constraints. Under an HMO, seniors
cannot choose their own doctors and may lose the care of a long-time
doctor. Also, the geographic restrictions would make an HMO plan
inappropriate/inconvenient for seniors who have more than one primary
residence. Much of HMO care is not reimbursable outside of the HMO
delivery system. Managed care through HMOs alone is clearly not the
solution to the question of affordable Medigap insurance.
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DIRECTIONS FOR REFORM
The first three sections of this report describe Medigap
insurance in Massachusetts and, by exploring cost and
enrollment trends in BC/BS, offer some explanation of the
origins of today's crisis. Below are both theoretical
directions for reform as well as analyses of concrete
legislative proposals.
THEORETICAL SOLUTIONS
In broadest terms, when working within the context of the insurance
market in Massachusetts, there are two theoretical approaches to the
problem of the growing lack of affordability of Medigap coverage:
o Reduce Medigap premium costs; or
o Subsidize Medigap premiums.
Reducing Medigap premium costs actually lowers the overall expense of
providing care, while the subsidization approach leaves the price
unaffected but provides funds to help seniors pay their premiums.
Each of these two basic approaches can be further broken down
into more concrete means for attaining cost reductions or premium
subsidization.
Methods of reducing the cost of Medigap premiums:
o Reduce the benefits of Medigap coverage, cutting out
expensive services and/or increasing enrollee co-
payments and deductibles;
o Reduce the amount insurers pay to providers for
Medigap services/benefits; or
o Reduce the utilization of Medigap services.
Methods of subsidizing Medigap premiums:
o "Cross subsidize" Medigap with other lines of
insurance which serve healthier, less expensive
populations;
o Find other subsidy sources within the health care
system (such as the Massachusetts Uncompensated
Care Pool); or
o Use tax revenue to subsidize Medigap products.
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These basic approaches as well as the strategies under each approach can
be combined in various ways in an effort to maximize their effectiveness.
The advantages and disadvantages of each approach are explained below.
REDUCTION OF MEDIGAP COSTS
Reducing actual premium costs is desirable but far from simple.
Each strategy for cost reduction has drawbacks or limitations.
Reduce Benefits. One approach, proposed by BC/BS in
testimony before the Joint Committee on Health Care, is to reduce
benefits. By covering fewer benefits, the price of insurance will go down.
Benefits can be reduced either by leaving selected services uncovered or by
increasing co-payments and deductibles. BC/BS contends that Medex 3 is
the "richest benefit package in the country" and that even with cuts in the
benefits it would still provide reasonably comprehensive coverage. A
change in the benefit packages would require a shift in the state
regulations.
The major problem with the benefit reduction approach is that it is
not real cost containment. Rather, it is cost shifting. Reducing benefits
does not control the amount of money spent on health care. It transfers
costs from the insurer to the individual through increased out-of-pocket
costs for uncovered services or through higher co-payments and
deductibles. This approach is therefore a regressive one in which the
resulting reduction of premiums is shifted to "higher cost elders,"
individuals who need and use more health services.
Reduce the Price Paid for Services. Another way to reduce
premiums is to reduce the price that an insurer pays providers for
Medigap services. However, reducing the price paid by insurers is
difficult, especially for traditional insurance plans such as those offered
through BC/BS. Much of what Medigap insurance pays for is governed by
the federal Medicare Program and is therefore out of the control of the
Medigap insurer. When Medicare raises the first day hospital deductible,
Medigap insurance premiums rise in order to cover the additional expense.
HMOs have a greater ability than BC/BS or other commercial
insurers to reduce the prices they pay providers for Medigap services.
Through Risk Contracts (see p. 6), they control not only the "gap"
payments but also the entire flow of Medicare dollars. However, when
Medicare increases costs to beneficiaries, HMOs may not be able to make
up the difference solely by reducing provider payments. Instead or in
addition, they may choose to raise premiums. While some HMO
27
premiums do remain lower than Medex premiums, there is no conclusive
evidence that explains how much of this difference results from lower
payments to providers, how much from reduced utilization, and how much
from insuring younger, healthier enrollees.
Although traditional insurers have limited control over the amount
paid for health care services, one area where they can have some impact is
in payment for prescription drugs. Prescription drugs, accounting for 40%
of the increases in recent years, represent one of the fastest growing
portions of Medex premium rates. (See p. 16.)
In accordance with their requirement to demonstrate efforts at cost
containment, BC/BS started a mail-order prescription service option for
maintenance medications which will reduce costs by enabling BC/BS to
obtain cheaper prices based on volume. Seniors will pay a fixed co-
payment of $2 for generic drugs and $10 for brand name drugs. BC/BS
has estimated that a mail-order drug option will cut drug costs by an
average of 10%. While the adoption of a mail-order prescription service
will certainly not drive down the current premium rates for Medex, the
hope is that the program will slow the rate of increase.
Reduce Utiintfujm. The third approach to reducing premiums is to
reduce utilization of services. This approach, too, has its limitations as a
cost containment strategy. The best way to reduce utilization is obviously
to prevent people from getting sick. Unfortunately, the medical profession
is oriented toward cure rather than prevention. The Medicare Program
and most Medigap plans offer little coverage for preventive care. Also,
elderly people have a lifetime of accumulated health risks. A serious
prevention effort aimed at keeping older people healthy needs to start at
an early age.
Another way to reduce utilization is to influence the behavior of
physicians. An example of reducing drug utilization is a proposal of
BC/BS known as "counter detailing." Counter detailing was proposed by
BC/BS in 1991. This new effort is a response to a practice of drug
companies called "detailing." Detailing takes place when drug companies
send representatives to doctors' offices to encourage the use of new drugs.
New drugs are often more expensive, and not always superior to drugs that
have been on the market for a while. Counter detailing involves sending a
representative to doctors' offices to inform physicians on the most cost-
effective ways of prescribing drugs.
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Efforts to reduce drug utilization by influencing the behavior of
physicians through counter detailing have potential for success because
Medigap insurance is the primary payer for prescription drugs. However,
since Medigap insurance pays only a small portion of the hospital or
physician bill, it is difficult to use Medigap reimbursement to influence
other ways doctors practice. In order to influence these other areas, it
would be necessary to make changes in the health care system as a whole,
or at least in Medicare, that would discourage unnecessary procedures,
establish standards of care, and reduce "defensive medicine" which arises
with the fear of medical malpractice.
Again, for HMOs the situation is somewhat different. Since many
HMOs have physicians on salary, they presumably have more control over
practice patterns. However, the fact that a number of HMOs have shifted
from Risk Contracts to more traditional Wrap Around Contracts
combined with the steady rise in HMO premiums suggests that controlling
either price or utilization may remain an unattained goal.
SUBSIDIZATION OF MEDIGAP PREMIUMS
Since subsidization does not inherently address cost containment, if
subsidization is chosen, either the size of the subsidy must be increased
annually or the real value of the subsidy will diminish. It is difficult to
come up with a subsidy source which can keep pace with the rising costs of
health care.
Like cost containment, there are several different approaches to
subsidizing Medigap premiums.
Cross Safryi^"? «"fli Other bi^nram-g I in**?- One way to subsidize
Medigap is to require insurers to sell Medigap at below the cost of claims
and administration. Insurers would then make up the difference by
raising their prices in other insurance products. This was, in fact what
happened with Medex during much of the 1980s. BC/BS regularly lost
money on Medex and offset those losses by reserves it had generated from
other lines of business. BC/BS was able to do this because it controlled
such a large percentage of the health insurance market and had a special
discount on hospital services that allowed for the creation of a surplus
from their group plans. Although not an explicit subsidy mechanism, this
process helped it to offset losses in its Medigap and nongroup insurance
lines.
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In a competitive insurance environment, however, this approach
does not work. Insurance companies compete by trying to offer the lowest
possible price to an employer group. If insurers have to make up for
losses in one line by charging more in another, they are likely to lose
business. BC/BS provides a good example of how cross subsidization does
not work in a competitive environment.
Over time, BC/BS has been losing the advantages that enabled it to
cross subsidize Medex. Although BC/BS still has a hospital discount,
HMOs are going out and negotiating their own discounts which are
sometimes larger than that of BC/BS. The "Blues" are losing their
competitive advantage. Also, the Blues are competing for business with
HMOs, which do not have to accept everyone and which do not have to
have contracts with every doctor and hospital. As a result, BC/BS is
steadily being under-priced by competitors and is losing business.
With health care costs rising and with fewer people subscribing to
BC/BS, the cost per BC/BS subscriber of subsidizing Medex has been
growing. In response to the increasing burden of cross subsidization in
combination with a number of external factors, BC/BS was granted a huge
Medigap rate increase in 1990. The increase transferred $100 million in
costs onto the elderly. In the three years preceding the rate increase,
BC/BS averaged approximately $48 million per year in Medex subsidies.
In 1990, BC/BS reported an internal Medex subsidy of $18 million. The
1990 rate increase did not, however, solve the long-term problems facing
BC/BS.
The Medex Relief Bill (see p. 33) was filed to restore the ability of
BC/BS to subsidize Medigap insurance.
Use Other Subsidy Source. Another potential subsidy source is the
state's "Uncompensated Care Pool" (also known as the "Hospital Free Care
Pool"). The Uncompensated Care Pool is money created by adding a
surcharge onto every private sector hospital bill in the state. In 1991 the
surcharge was about 11%. There is no surcharge on Medicare or Medicaid
bills.
This surcharge is then used to pay hospitals for giving care to the
uninsured or underinsured. Low-income elders who do not have Medigap
insurance sometimes use the pool to pay for their first-day hospital
deductible.
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Since elders are already using the pool, some have suggested that
instead of paying hospital bills, money from the pool could be targeted to
subsidize insurance. (See Revised Medigap Relief Bill and Senate Bill 406,
p. 34.) Pool money could be used to fund vouchers for the elderly or could
be paid directly to insurers to offset losses in Medigap insurance. This
approach would increase the need for free care pool funds, and therefore
increase the hospital surcharge needed to fund the pool.
Using the pool has two drawbacks. First, with a cap on the size of
the pool, most analysts agree that it is already under funded, by perhaps
$100 million or more. Diverting some of the pool to subsidize Medigap
could pit underinsured elders against uninsured workers in a fight over
scarce pool dollars.
Secondly, the pool is not funded very equitably. The pool is
essentially a "sickness tax." While all privately insured people pay into the
pool indirectly via premiums to insurance companies, sicker groups pay
more than healthy groups because they use the hospital more.
Use Tax Revenue. Using either general revenue or a dedicated tax
to subsidize Medigap is the third main alternative. The advantage of tax
revenue is that it is likely to be more equitable than pool funding. The
problem with using general revenue is that again, like the Uncompensated
Care Pool, it has the potential of pitting the elderly against other needy
groups (and even against other elders), particularly at a time when health
care, housing, and other programs are being cut. A dedicated tax avoids
this pitfall. This was the approach used in the 1989 Medigap Assistance
Bill. This bill was not adopted. The main road block to this approach is
political. Neither the Governor nor the Legislature is considering new tax
measures in 1991.
PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
Federal Proposals
The Pepper Commission, a United States bipartisan commission on
comprehensive health care, released its final report in the fall of 1990.
Included in its proposals for health care reform were specific sections on
reforms for the over 65 population. The Commission recommended the
following:
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o Federal assistance with Medicare premiums and
deductibles for all seniors below 200% of poverty;
o Expansion of Medicare services to include selected
preventive services; and
o Medigap insurance reforms, including counseling at
local levels, extension of "federal standards," and
increased consumer protections.
The Pepper Commission estimated that the proposed reforms would
improve health care for 30 million Americans at a total cost to the federal
government of $2.8 billion. The report did not include a financing
mechanism to meet the additional costs.
Some of the recommendations of the Pepper Commission have been
adopted. A part of the Medicare Catastrophic Act that was not repealed
includes the expansion of Medicare services to cover mammograms and
the Qualified Medicare Beneficiary Program (see p. 23) which pays for
Medicare premiums and deductibles for seniors at the poverty line. OBRA
'90 (see p. 8) approved increased federal standards and consumer
protections. Federal assistance for all seniors below 200% of poverty
remains unaddressed.
State Initiatives
In addition to the federal proposals embraced by the Pepper
Commission and included in other reforms, several bills designed to
address the affordability of Medigap insurance have been filed in
Massachusetts in 1991. Each of the proposals uses a different strategy to
deal with the health insurance needs of senior citizens.
Th^ Fflpily Hejlfh Plan. As a solution to the health care crisis
which is plaguing the entire state, young and old alike, Representative
John McDonough (D - Jamaica Plain) filed a comprehensive health care
reform bill (House Bill 4145). This bill, known as the Family Health Plan
(FHP), would provide access to basic health care for all residents of
Massachusetts, regardless of health status, employment, or age.
The FHP would provide all seniors with Medigap insurance which
would cover Medicare deductibles, co-payments, and prescription drugs. If
FHP had been in effect in 1990, seniors would have paid $35 per month
for coverage equivalent to Medex 3. In 1990, Medex 3 cost $85.95 per
month.
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The FHP would reduce costs for seniors by cross-subsidizing instead
of creating separate senior risk pools. The cost of health care for the
elderly would be averaged into the premiums all residents would be
required to pay. The FHP also would offer the prospect of systemic cost
containment. For example, one statewide purchaser rather than multiple
purchasers would lower costs across the board.
The FHP would require fundamental structural changes in the
health care system -- most dramatically in the role of the health insurance
system. To implement such a dramatic change, advocates would have to
overcome both the public skepticism associated with expanding the role of
government and the powerful institutional opposition from those who
benefit from the current health care financing system. In addition, the
shift from a premium-based to a tax-based system would, in the short run,
substantially reallocate health care costs, creating many winners and
losers.
Medex Relief Bill The Medex Relief Bill (House Bill 4170) would
provide assistance to all Medex subscribers without tax increases or new
state funding.
BC/BS, currently the primary insurer for Medigap subscribers,
would, with the help of discounts on hospital charges, continue to serve the
majority of the seniors insured by Medigap products. However, in order
for BC/BS to remain competitive, commercial insurers and HMOs would
have to offer community rates for all Medigap, small group, and nongroup
products that they offer and would not be allowed to discriminate in the
sale of these policies based on age or health status. These provisions
would force the commercial or HMO insurers to take their share of the
sicker members of these groups should they choose to offer such products.
The ability of commercial insurers and HMOs to negotiate discounts on
hospital charges would be directly related to their participation in the
market for Medigap, small group, and nongroup products.
In return for the restrictions placed on commercial and HMO
insurers, BC/BS would have to dedicate a fixed percentage of the reserves
it was allowed to generate from hospital discounts to Medex premium
costs. The result would be a dollar decrease in premiums paid by all
Medex subscribers. The BC/BS discount could be raised in order to
adjust for the size of subsidies.
While all Medex subscribers would receive a subsidy of roughly
$300, low-income subscribers would receive an additional $360, the dollar
equivalent of the portion of the premium attributed to hospital claim
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costs. Their hospital care would be charged to the free care pool. Because
low-income seniors are entitled to free care (see p. 30), the portion of their
premium dedicated to hospital costs would be covered by the pool.
Additionally, under House Bill 4170, all future Medigap rate
increases would be limited to the Consumer Price Index (CPI)-Medical
Care rate of inflation. Although the Medical Care rate of inflation,
averaging 9% annually in Massachusetts, is significantly higher than the
SSCOLAs, it is significantly lower than the Medex rate increases in recent
years. Seniors would be protected from retroactive effective dates that
apply regarding such increases.
While the change required for the adoption of the Medex Relief Bill
would be less drastic than that required for the FHP, it does represent
substantial change, and, as a result, would elicit serious political
opposition.
The current practice of discounting is one in which individual
insurers and hospitals negotiate their own rates. Under the bill,
negotiating would be prohibited except to subsidize socially determined
ends (for example, Medigap). The level of these discounts would be set by
the state. Strict regulation of hospital prices moves in the opposite
direction from that which Massachusetts is currently pursuing. The trend
is for more insurance companies and HMOs to negotiate hospital
discounts. Also, since neither the free care pool nor the BC/BS discount
affect businesses who do not provide insurance, some businesses that
would not be contributing to the cost of Medigap for their retirees.
Revised M^igap Relief BilL The Joint Committee on Insurance
rewrote the Medex Relief bill, changing the funding mechanism and
eliminating the protection of the CPI-Medical Care rate of inflation. The
new bill (House Bill 5530) calls for the transfer of $75 million annually
from the free care pool to a trust to subsidize Medigap insurance
beginning in January 1992. There would be full subsidization for enrollees
at or below the federal poverty level and partial subsidization for
individuals up to 300% of poverty.
While this is perhaps the most politically feasible option in the
short run, it would increase the demand on the free care pool. As noted
previously there are several drawbacks to this approach. Also, because the
bill lacks any cost containment provisions, the size of the subsidy would
need to be increased annually or the value of the subsidy would steadily
erode.
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Hospital Finance Bill
.
Another approach to using the free care pool
relies on payments to insurance companies instead of to individual
subscribers. This approach is embodied in Senate Bill 406, sponsored by
Senator Edward Burke (D - Framingham) as part of a larger hospital
finance bill.
Senate Bill 406 would require that free care pool funds be used to
reimburse insurers for 50% of losses they incur in their Medigap line for
fee-for-service (indemnity) insurance and for 75% of losses for managed
care plans. (The intent is to encourage and reward managed care plans.)
If adequate funds are not available from the free care pool, payments to
insurers would be reduced in proportion to each insurer's market share,
not in proportion to the size of their loss.
For example, suppose there are two insurance companies that sell
Medigap insurance. Company 1 has 75% of the business and Company 2
has 25%. Each insurer loses $20 million dollars on Medigap. If there is
only $10 million available to subsidize Medigap, Company 1 will get $7.5
million, in proportion to its 75% of the market, and Company 2 will get
$2.5 million.
In order to be eligible to receive the subsidy, insurers must meet the
following criteria. They must:
o hold an annual open enrollment period;
o charge reduced premiums to elders with incomes
below 300% of the poverty line; and
o limit premium increases to not more than 10%
annually.
The cost of determining eligibility for the subsidy rests with the insurer.
This proposal calls for less state administration than is necessary for a
voucher program.
However, this approach does not provide stability for elders.
Rather than promoting an entitlement for the elder person, it entitles
insurers. Nothing in the bill determines the size of the available subsidy
per elder or how much total money will be available. Insurers can decide
whether they would be better off with a small Medigap rate increase and
write off their losses, or a large increase and no rate subsidy in any given
year.
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When adequate funding is available, payment from the free care
pool to the insurer is connected to the size of losses rather than to the size
of the subsidy being offered to seniors. Therefore, the incentive is for
insurers to allocate losses to their Medigap insurance while offering the
smallest subsidy possible. Despite the amount of the rate subsidy, all
insurers receive payments from the free care pool equivalent to 50% of
total losses for fee-for-service plans. The nominal subsidy which is
encouraged by the financial incentives of this bill may do very little to
make Medigap insurance more affordable for those who can least afford it.
In any case, an insurer is still worse off offering Medigap and
assuming some financial loss than not offering policies at all. It is not
clear that this approach will do more than improve the cash position of
BC/BS, which is obligated to offer Medigap.
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CONCLUSION
Coverage for the gaps in the Medicare Program was not a concern for
those who drafted the federal law in 1965. When Medicare began, Medicaid
served as Medigap insurance for low-income elders, and the relatively
nominal out-of-pocket Medicare costs (the original hospital deductible was
$40) were not beyond the financial resources of middle-income seniors.
However, as health care costs have continued to outpace the growth of elders'
income, many near-poor elders are unable to afford either out-of-pocket costs
or Medigap premiums.
It is clear that nothing approaching universal Medigap coverage can
be achieved without relying on a cross-generational subsidy. However, basic
questions of who will pay the subsidy, how it will be collected, and who will
receive it remain unanswered. The problem of unchecked medical inflation
makes the Medigap problem especially difficult to resolve. Without control
over health care costs, subsidies will continually have to be increased.
While solutions to this problem have begun to be debated both in
Congress and in the Massachusetts Legislature, progress has been slow. The
most comprehensive solution to the problem may be the adoption of a
universal health care system such as those in Western Europe or the
Commonwealth countries (Great Britain, Canada, Australia). However, such
an approach, whether pursued nationally, or on a state-by-state basis, faces
significant political barriers. Other less sweeping reforms may address the
problem in the short run, providing temporary relief to Massachusetts elders,
but any true long-term solution must both offer a subsidy and also bring
stabilization to the rising cost of health care.
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GLOSSARY
ADVERSE SELECTION
Adverse selection occurs when an insurance policy attracts very sick
enrollees who have a greater than average number of claims. These
individuals then become concentrated in particular insurance plans, driving
up the price. Insurance companies use denial of coverage, waiting periods,
and pre-existing condition exclusions to protect themselves from adverse
selection.
AGE-RATING
Age-rating is the practice of basing premiums on the age of individuals
when they apply for health coverage. Older seniors pay higher premiums.
BAN ON BALANCE BILLING
The ban on balance billing is a restriction that prohibits a provider
from charging and collecting more for a medical service than an insurance
plan will cover. The term is most commonly used in reference to a
Massachusetts law requiring doctors to abide by Medicare rates.
COMMUNITY RATING
Community rating is the practice of setting insurance rates by
averaging all enrollees' costs together. Everyone served by an insurer pays
the same premium for a given benefit package, regardless of individual health
status.
CO-PAYMENT
A co-payment is the share of the cost of care that the recipient must
pay. For example, under the new mail-order prescription drug options,
seniors on Medex 3 pay a co-payment of $10 for every brand-name
prescription and $2 for every generic prescription. Medex pays the
remainder.
COST CONTRACTS
These plans cover Medicare Part A outside the HMO delivery system
(with the exclusion of deductibles and co-payments), but offer coverage for
Part B services only within the HMO delivery system. (See Health
Maintenance Organization.)
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COUNTER DETAILING
Counter detailing is an effort on the part of BC/BS to encourage cost-
effective use of drugs. It sends representatives to doctors' offices to advocate
the use of the most appropriate and cost-effective drugs. Newer, more
expensive options are not always superior to drugs that have been on the
market longer. (See Detailing.)
DEDUCTIBLE
A deductible is an initial dollar amount of health care cost that an
individual must incur before an insurer begins to pay the cost of the health
services. For example, the Medicare first-day hospital deductible is $628. If
seniors are without supplemental insurance that covers this cost, they are
responsible for paying the $628 before Medicare coverage begins.
DELIVERY SYSTEM
A delivery system is a network of health care providers, covering a
specified geographic area, which provides the medical services for enrollees
in HMOs.
DETAILING
Detailing takes place when drug companies send representatives to
doctors' offices in an effort to encourage the use of new drugs, often without
regard to effectiveness or cost.
DOWNGRADING
Downgrading occurs when an individuals changes his/her health
insurance policy to one that offers less comprehensive coverage.
FEE-FOR-SERVICE PLAN
A fee-for-service plan is a policy under which an insurer reimburses
hospitals and physicians each time an enrollee receives care. The majority
of BC/BS plans are fee-for-service plans. This type of policy is also referred
to as an indemnity plan.
GROUP PLANS
Group plans are insurance policies offered to individuals by way of a
past or present employer or union or a member-based organization. Group
plans are subject to far less regulation than nongroup plans.
HEALTH MAINTENANCE ORGANIZATION
Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs) are delivery systems that
act both as insurers and providers of health care. The three types of HMO
products available to Medicare recipients are Cost Contracts, Risk Contracts,
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and Wrap-Around Contracts (see this Glossary). All three have some
restrictions on the health care providers that an enrollee may use.
LOSS RATIOS
Loss ratios are the specified percentages of premiums that must be
dedicated to enrollee benefits. The remaining portion of the premium may
go to such things as administrative costs and company profits.
MEDEX
Medex is the brand name of the Medigap policies offered by Blue
Cross and Blue Shield of Massachusetts.
MEDICAID PROGRAM
The Medicaid Program is a joint federal/state health insurance
program for the poor.
MEDICARE PROGRAM
The Medicare Program is a federal health insurance program for
people over 65 as well as certain disabled individuals.
MEDIGAP INSURANCE
Medigap insurance is health insurance, offered by various private
insurers, that supplements the federal Medicare Program.
NONGROUP PLANS
Nongroup plans are insurance policies negotiated directly between an
individual and an insurer. These policies are also referred to as individual
or direct-billed policies.
PRE-EXISTING CONDITION EXCLUSIONS
Pre-existing condition exclusions are practices of insurance companies
to deny payment for any services related to health problems that have been
treated (or simply occurred) before the coverage began. Sometimes the policy
will exclude coverage for a particular condition indefinitely while other
policies will have a period of time (for example, a waiting period of three
months) during which the insurance company will not provide coverage for
a pre-existing condition.
PREMIUMS
Premiums are the regular payments made by enrollees to health
insurance companies in exchange for their coverage.
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RISK CONTRACTS
These plans are substitutes for rather than supplements to the
Medicare Program. All services must be received in the HMO delivery
system. (See Health Maintenance Organization.)
RISK POOL
A risk pool forms when people are grouped together for the purpose
of setting premium rates.
UNCOMPENSATED CARE POOL
The Uncompensated Care Pool, part of the 1988 Universal Health
Care law, reimburses hospitals for the free care and reduced-cost care they
provide to uninsured and underinsured individuals. Funding for the pool
comes from surcharges on hospital bills. Individuals and families whose
incomes are below 200% of poverty are entitled to free care. Those with
incomes between 200% and 400% of poverty are entitled to partial free care.
The Uncompensated Free Care Pool is also known as the Hospital Free Care
Pool.
UNDERWRITING
Underwriting is the process of assessing health and cost risks for
individuals applying for insurance coverage and pricing the premiums
accordingly.
UNIVERSAL HEALTH CARE LAW
The Universal Health Care law, passed in 1988, has brought health
care coverage to thousands of uninsured residents of Massachusetts. The
individual programs of the Universal Health Care law include the
CommonHealth Program for working disabled adults and disabled children,
the Unemployed/Uninsured Program, and the Healthy Start Program for
pregnant women. The Universal Health Care law is also known as Chapter
23 and the Health Security Act.
WATTING PERIODS
Waiting periods are requirements that an insured person wait a
certain number of months or years after beginning an insurance policy before
services are covered by the insurance company. The practice is designed to
discourage signing up for insurance only when the care is needed.
WRAP-AROUND CONTRACTS
These plans function much like traditional Medigap policies. If care
is received within the HMO delivery system, all benefits apply. If services are
obtained outside the system, Medicare benefits will be covered but the
individual is responsible for deductibles and co-payments. (See Health
Maintenance Organization.)
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THE GERONTOLOGY INSTITUTE
The University of Massachusetts at Boston
Established in 1984, the Gerontology Institute at the University of
Massachusetts at Boston furthers the University's commitment to the study and
development of social policy on aging. The Institute conducts policy research
on issues affecting older people and their families. In addition, the Institute
assists national, state, and local organizations analyze policy issues and
formulate policy options on matters concerning the elderly. Core funding is
provided by the Massachusetts Legislature. Major projects are funded through
grants and contracts.
Programs of the Institute are carried out through two divisions: The
Frank J. Manning Research Division and the Public Policy Division. A major
research priority is productive aging, that is, opportunities for older people to
play useful social roles. A second priority is long-term care for the elderly.
Additional major concerns of the Public Policy Division include health care
policy, income security policy, and housing, with particular attention to the
special needs of racial and ethnic minority elderly.
In the fall of 1990, the University introduced a Ph.D. program in
Gerontology with an emphasis in social policy. It is one of two such programs
in the country. The Institute is a teaching resource for the Ph.D. program. In
addition, the Institute provides doctoral students with experience in research
and policy analysis.
The Institute also supports the University's Gerontology Certificate
program. A one-year program of concentrated study, the Gerontology
Certificate program prepares older learners for roles in aging services. Most
students are over 60 years of age. Through an Advanced Certificate program,
selected graduates participate in applied research projects within the Institute.
The regular involvement of older people helps to assure that Institute projects
reflect the concerns of older people.
Another activity of the Institute is the publication of a scholarly qua
rterly with an international perspective, the Journal of Aging & Social Policy .
The journal is issued by Haworth Press.
Since its formation, the Institute has been directed by Scott A. Bass,
Ph.D. It has a permanent faculty and staff of approximately 16 people and is
located in the heart of Boston in the University's Downtown Center.
